Sunday, November 27, 2011

What about European mobility?

If we are to believe the latest new, France and Germany are now talking about a European fiscal union, widely-held to be what is missing from the failed Euro monetary experiment. It is commonly believed that when a supra-national fiscal body can spend to compensate for private sector losses and/or dissaving in a particular region, this European experiment will be all hunky dory.

But what about labour mobility? Can Greeks or Irish just decide to uproot themselves and start anew in Germany? Can the French do it? Or vise-versa, can Germans just decide to look for jobs in Greece or Portugal? European financial and market integration can increase prosperity in a particular country or sector, while causing social upheaval in another. Inequality arises because while businesses can take their money and technology anywhere in the common area, their workers cannot follow suit, or counter with similar moves of their own. People cannot mitigate the deflationary effects of capital leaving one region by migrating to another, or mute the harsh consequences of a neighbour country’s continual trade surpluses, by piling on to that country.

While countercyclical fiscal policy can help alleviate these deflationary effects, a lack of mobility will still hamper efficient distribution of the benefits of integration. After all, integration probably wasn't pursued merely to allow one country to capture all its commercial value, while another region ends up perennially on welfare, or on make-work programs. There's probably no true union unless all Europeans consider themselves to be Europeans first, who just chose to live in the region they live in. Without freedom of mobility, they're all probably better off having both fiscal and monetary sovereignty.

Thursday, November 17, 2011

The High-Beta Rich: A review

I don't normally make book reviews here in the blog, but I recently read Robert Frank's The High-Beta Rich. Now this is not the same Robert Frank who wrote an economics textbook with Ben Bernanke. He's WSJ's wealth reporter who also wrote Richistan: A Journey through the American Wealth Boom. In High-Beta Rich, Frank revisits the lives of some of the people he profiled in Richistan, and follows up on what has happened to them in the years since he wrote the first book in 2006. By 2011, some of these rich people have since gone from riches to rags, or merely to less affluence. He also follows up on some people whose jobs it was to serve the needs of the rich, and profiles how many of them are now finding it hard to secure stable jobs from the rich since the 2008 economic crisis.

The book's central theme is how the rich's fortunes now depend largely on rising asset values, and how asset price movements correspondingly affect their over-all wealth, and so affect their consumption of services, and hence, employment of a lot of people. The book tells stories of formerly rich people, how they came into big wealth during the two decades of continuous rise in debt and asset values, and the rise in conspicuous consumption that came with it. It relates anecdotes of people who bought rich man's toys such as Maseratis, yachts, private jets, and hired private armies of household help, from personal chefs, personal masseuses to household managers a.k.a. butlers. It tells of their experiences finding themselves suddenly back in the world of the non-rich, losing mansions, and then letting go of their butlers .

The book tells of how the rich and their money took over previously more egalitarian towns, such as Aspen, and the rising cost of living that drove away the locals and the economy that thrived on serving those locals, and how in its place arose an economy that simply caters to the whims and demands of the very rich. In one of the chapters, this statement sticks out:

When the waves of high-beta wealth come crashing down, they can affect an entire town like Aspen as well as a much larger canvas like the American consumer economy. In a plutonomy, we're all occasional butlers now, relying in the increasingly erratic jobs and spending of the wealthy.

Frank then elevates the discussion to the state government level and profiles California, which as he shows, has over the years grown more dependent on tax revenues from a few large income tax payers who are largely high-beta rich from Silicon Valley. This sentence stands out:

The masses at the bottom require increased funding for entitlements and social programs. But those at the top, who are increasingly paying for those programs, will exert an outsize influence on politicians through their money and will lobby for lower tax rates. The result is that governments will have more booms and busts and permanent deficits.

I have a problem with one of the author's proposed solutions to the problem of over-dependence on the high-beta rich - that governments, companies, and individuals need to save more during booms so they ride out the busts. This coordinated desire by all sectors of the economy to suddenly save simultaneously is precisely what turns the booms into sudden busts. While the author is referring to local governments, which could literally run out of money, it would have been better if he had made a distinction between a local government, which is merely a currency user, and a sovereign currency-issuing federal government. That sovereign assumes the counter-party role of doing the dissaving whenever the other sectors, the companies and individuals, suddenly stop spending, so as to ensure that the whole economy doesn't suddenly grind to a complete halt.

I would also have appreciated a furthering of this idea:

In the age of high-beta wealth, most of the spending and taxpaying in America will be directed by the stock market. As Greenspan noted, stocks are no longer just measurements of growth and decline, but the main drivers of both. In an economy dominated by the rich, S&P is the new GDP.
While I agree with this statement, I would take it further and say that therein lies the main problem: that S&P is the new GDP, and that people have moved away from the idea of acquiring and maintaing wealth via continuous investment in actual companies, and into getting rich by buying and cashing out at the right time. Nobody plays for the long haul anymore, including those who originally got rich the classic way. Many eventually sell out and use the sudden liquidity speculating in short term investments instead, which while in aggregate results in the self-perpetuating effect of increasing the prices of those very same investments, does not really result in creating new productive endeavours, which is a prerequisite for growing GDP, which is then a prerequisite for the continuous rise in S&P. Without real investments and real growth in the real economy, S&P growth coming from just more money chasing the same investments is not sustainable, and the money being taken out of the real economy will eventually make itself evident with the S&P boom and bust. (Author does profile one guy near the end who gets it).

Nonetheless, if you want a change from reading long serious economic tomes of how and why the economy now experiences more frequent booms and busts, and want to lose yourself in amusing stories of the 'high-beta rich', then this book is worth a read. I found it so when reading my review book.

Saturday, November 12, 2011

Was QE any help at all

I found this statement made by a commenter at another blog several months ago:

"I agree; I think the MMT people are too scathing of what is a simplified explanation of how monetary policy works in normal times. In normal times, starting from an equilibrium in which reserves are held according to their cost and utility, selling more reserves makes it profitable for banks to expand their balance sheets, hence the multiplier, but first the financial crisis and then the payment of interest on reserves altered the balance of their cost and utility. The multiplier collapsed, and it was necessary to add reserves just to serve the existing size of banks’ balance sheets. Moreover when QE involves asset purchases from non-bank counterparties, its initial effect is to expand banks’ balance sheets anyway."

I asked the commenter: What do you mean by “selling more reserves makes it profitable for banks to expand their balance sheets”? I'm guessing this statement indicates you believe that banks lend their deposits to other banks, and that they need to have these reserves first before they can leaned and "expand their balance sheets". So what is the point of the Fed flooding the whole system with reserves then? QE2 in flooding the banks with reserves ensured that no bank will need to borrow reserves anymore, and that no one will need deposits anymore.

MMTers explain that loans are made when there are creditworthy borrowers on hand. Extending a loan (which increases the bank's asset) creates a deposit for the borrower (which creates the offsetting bank liability). Reserves are only later obtained when and if the loan is withdrawn from the bank, or otherwise paid to another bank. Because the bank now has an interest earning loan, it can easily acquire the reserves by borrowing from other banks or attracting new deposits. Central bank intervention via "flooding banks with reserves" does not force banks to make more loans if there are no creditworthy borrowers to be found. If you believe having more reserves is what causes banks to lend, then you probably believe that banks scamper to find depositors first before they allow you to use up your credit card.

I also asked: What do you mean “payment of interest on reserves altered the balance of their cost and utility”? That many bank loans were priced out of the market by the interest on reserves? Is that how low lending rates have gone, that a mere 25 bps IOR discourages banks from making any more loans? Again, this begs the question - why would the Fed "flood the market with reserves" only to borrow them again from the banks with interest?

MMTers explain that the Fed pays IOR to keep the federal funds rate at their policy rate. Otherwise, all that new reserve will be lent on the interbank market at zero, and the fed will completely lose monetary policy control.

And I asked: What do you mean by “it was necessary to add reserves just to serve the existing size of banks’ balance sheets”? What did exchanging Treasuries for reserves “add” to “serve the size of bank balance sheets”?

MMTers explain that QE did not really add reserves net financial assets to banks, and only exchanged their interest-paying risk free government bonds with non-interest-paying bank reserves. In taking away their risk-free interest earning assets, QE ensured that banks start considering retail deposits as profit drains rather than the most cost-efficient source of reserves. Rather than encouraging them to make new loans, it likely discouraged them from accepting more deposits, or accepting them without charging bank fees.

The commenter promised a long blog post explaining his view of the money multiplier and how QE enables this "money multiplier" to function again. After seven months, I'm still waiting.

Saturday, November 5, 2011

Similarity of China's USD peg with the Euro monetary union

Many people continue to hold the false notion that foreign creditors like China are keeping the USD (US currency) value afloat, and that when they stop buying US debt, the value of the USD (US currency) will fall. The reality is that China doesn't need to keep buying US bonds to keep the USD from falling. China buying US bonds is not what keeps USD value up. The Chinese are already locked into buying USD indefinitely, whether they buy its bonds or not, because that’s what they do every time they incur a trade surplus with the US denominated in USD. The dollar keeps strong only if, and this is important, China’s trade surplus is in USD.

Now, the Chinese agree to engage in trade with the US in USD denomination because this allows them to keep their peg with the USD, and no matter how big a surplus they incur with the US, all that influx of USD into their economy will not raise the value of their own currency for as long as the surplus is in USD. That means continuing demand for USD for as long as the peg is in place, and the Chinese wish to maintain their trade surplus. The irony is that, only when the US goes MMT, and prints dollars as needed to fund its trade deficits with China while keeping its own local employment up, will the Chinese see the error of their ways and abandon the peg.

For now, the Chinese continue to maintain the peg despite just getting what to them are useless not-to-be-spent USD in order to maintain their trade surplus, and to keep their own employment up, not out of benevolence to the US. It follows, ironically, that all it takes to arrest the unstoppable increase in US borrowings is for China to accept that the hoard it has accumulated all these years is essentially worthless (because the US can just print more of it to pay them), unless it decides to spend it all back in the US (which means they will start incurring net trade deficits with the US).

If China decides to spend their accumulated dollars domestically in China instead, then that ends their sterilization of the surplus, and effectively ends their peg, and the yuan will then rise vis-a-vis the US dollar. Ending the peg would result in US trade surpluses with China, so there will effectively be less Chinese demand for US treasuries. But the lost demand from China will just be a wash since there will be less need for US borrowings that are due to its deficits with China.

I think China’s main concern, rather than attaining a nice return on its US debt investments, should be that their accumulated dollars do not fall in value vs other currencies. I don’t think they’re too happy with the dollar’s recent fall, which is just as well. They should have spent that money back in the US long ago. That's the only real use for their large accumulation of foreign currency.

China's peg and the current monetary union in Europe are very similar in nature and intent (of those who propagate them). Continued monetary union has in effect pegged the core countries' (like Germany's) currency with that of the PIIGS, thereby giving the core the same perpetual trade advantages over the latter that China has with the US. And just like China’s peg to the US dollar, Germany’s currency peg to the PIIGS via the Euro is causing the extensive sovereign borrowings of the latter countries.

This is the reason Europe is now being dragged, German fear of inflation notwithstanding, into the same printing binge as the US dollar. Just look at how the EFSF is supposed to prop up the PIIGS. For how long will this continue before the Germans blink and stop the endless Euro printing? Both the ECB now (and the German banks previously) have continued to pledge buying Greek debt, in order to prop this system up, and to continue with the current status quo. They enjoy continuous trade surpluses with the PIIGS without altering their superior terms of trade, which eventually would happen if each had their own currency. All the Germans need to do to maintain their current terms of trade is to keep the Greeks in a common currency with them. German terms of trade keeps strong only if, and this is important, they keep the common currency with those that currently incur deficits with them. That means continuing Greek demand for the money that Germany ends up with a lot of. So Germany has to ensure that someone keeps buying Greek bonds, to keep their superior terms of trade vis-a-vis the Greeks.

Ironically, all it takes to arrest the unstoppable increase in Greek borrowings is for Germany to accept that the currency hoard it has accumulated all these years is essentially worthless (because the Greeks can't just print more of it to pay them, and will likely default sooner or later), unless Germany decides to spend more of it in Greek products. That's the only real use for their large accumulation of the common currency.

If Germany decides to spend its surplus Euro domestically in Germany instead, then that increases their domestic inflation and ends their superior terms of trade, while the Greek terms of trade rises vis-a-vis theirs. Germans have so far maintained the monetary union despite just getting what to them are useless Greek debt in order to maintain the surplus, and keep their own employment up, and not out of benevolence to the Greeks. The irony is that, only when the EU goes MMT, and prints the Euro as needed to fund trade deficits while keeping Greek employment up, will the Germans see the error of their ways and abandon the peg/common currency.

Sunday, October 30, 2011

Is there a good reason and target for doing QE now

There's been a lot of press for NGDP targeting level lately, which I see as contingent continuous Quantitative Easing. Contingent because as long as NGDP is not up to target level, there'll be QE galore until it does. Continuous because anytime it ever falls below trend, up until the time policymakers say enough with targeting trend level, the monetary nuclear option a la Chuck Norris will be turned to. I've posted on why I think it would be difficult to target NGDP level. Essentially, I think monetary policy would be ineffective now because people are already indebted, many are already unemployed, and rates are already at zero. Putting rates at negative doesn't make the indebted go into more debt, or the unemployed to engage in more spending. The few who who may have most of the money can probably go around the confines of the fed's jurisdiction. A good metaphor for the Fed doing NGP targeting would probably be Charlie Chaplin, who, unable to to control and drive his runaway car, will try to move the road instead to where the car is going so it seems the car is going in the right direction. So is there an alternative target for doing QE?

How about targeting a desired fiscal spending level? If you look at QE as essentially a monetization of sovereign debt, you could look at it as enabling more fiscal policy action. Although excess reserves created by QE may not fund more bank loans, any excess could be put by banks into more liquid marketable securities. If these natural buyers of government bonds suddenly have more cash, and lesser of the bonds, will they be more susceptible to buy bonds in the next auction? Yes. But is QE2 necessary to ensure that funds are available for the next government bond auctions? No. Government deficits, or government spending, by their nature, create private sector income. It is this private sector income which can then be used for consumption in more private sector goods, and eventually result in private sector savings, which go into commercial banks as deposits, which causes bank reserves to increase, which makes banks buy more government securities.

How about targeting currency value? Will it achieve one of the lesser talked about objectives of trade policy – realigning and revaluing of global currency values, to make them more reflective of actual growth rates in various economies? What quantitative easing would do, more than causing the hoped for but largely improbable reflation in the US economy, is to cause this inflation elsewhere, mainly due to shifts in hot money flows and the carry trade, particularly to the countries that peg themselves to the US dollar. A fast-rising inflation will crush these economies. Inflation will end up killing their people’s real income, and hence, their purchasing power, and lead to over-all depression in their economy. They would rather have capital controls, and likely, would rather give up the peg than allow hyperinflation to kill their economies. But will it result in currency war instead, and a race to the bottom? Maybe a good metaphor for QE is releasing the kraken.

Unless QE is actually in the form of a monetary helicopter drop to actual job-creating ventures, both government or private sector-led, let's just stop thinking about QE.


Friday, October 21, 2011

NGDP level targeting, savings, and expected future inflation

I still really cannot get my head around NGDP level targeting. It’s lately been getting traction as the preferred method to get the US out off recession. What am I missing here? Why do I only see pitfalls ? Why are all neoliberal economists now suddenly behind it? Until I can get answers to the following, color me skeptical.

What happens when the fed buys up all of the financial assets from the private sector? I mean, this is how it expects people to go from hoarding money to actually spending it, right? Under NGDP targeting, the fed is expected to buy up all investment outlets (and possibly proponents will eventually propose to broaden the Fed’s mandate to buying up not just government bonds, but all sorts of private sector bonds, equities, commodities, real estate or what not....theoretically until the fed either owns everything, or until people are convinced to start buying stuff before the Fed purchases them out of the market). I mean this is the mechanism in a nutshell, isn’t it?

So let’s lay out some scenarios. Supposing the Fed does buy up most if not all government securities. (This is assuming it takes that much before Investors are actually convinced that gambling, risking money is more preferable to just hoarding in today's economic environment). So there are no more investment outlets for pensions funds, insurance funds, mutual funds. What then? Are we supposed to expect them to start investing in new startups? Risking equities? In even more exotic commodities? What if (and this is what I presume will happen) they just decide to return all that money back to the people? So now we’ve made insurance firms, money market mutual funds, pension funds redundant. And people who wanted to save money (either for retirement, for future education, for future health needs, or whatever rainy day) now can no longer do so, and instead have their money back instead. Will they use it spend on that new car, a bigger home, a new wardrobe? Or maybe they will they still insist on still saving that money? My guess is the latter, and they'd probably save even more, after all they still have to prepare for retirement, for future education, for future health needs, or whatever rainy day, and in the meantime they have no more outlets that earn interest.

And what about banks? Suppose that in the Fed’s quest to ensure that holy grail of consistent 5% inflation (even in the face of 10% unemployment), it ends up buying up most if not all of the banking system’s government bonds. So now banks have no more risk-free outlet. They have to put all their eggs in 100% risk-weighted assets. Basel wouldn’t approve. Will they actually put those new reserves in new loans? I think not. Maybe they’ll just return the depositors’ money, or start charging people for keeping their money. So will the people start spending their deposits instead? My guess is no. They have to save even more just to pay those new excessive banking fees, and have to save even more because, with increased inflation expectations, they now expect to need even greater savings to fund that retirement, future education, future health needs, or whatever rainy day.

So what happens if people are indeed convinced by the fed that inflation will indeed increase, and increase with absolute certainty? What prevents them from putting their money abroad? I mean, what mechanism prevents people who receive this newly-printed currency in exchange for their savings - from deserting to a foreign currency rather than spending it locally? A higher inflation expectation can cut two ways: It can cause people to spend their money now before it loses value, or it can cause people to put their savings in foreign currency, which is expected to keep its value. We’re right back to currency war, and now the US has just escalated the conflict. What would the likely international counterstrike be?

Nick Rowe says that a credible central bank is a bit like Chuck Norris.

Chuck Norris simply looks at the target variable, and it moves to wherever he wants it to go. It looks like magic. But it works because nobody wants Chuck Norris to carry out his implicit threat. So he doesn't need to.

This analogy comes from the market monetarist explanation of the ‘expectations shaping’ mechanism of NGDP targeting. I think the apt analogy would be Chuck Norris strapping himself with a bomb, and telling everyone that if nobody goes for the exits, then he will blow the whole place up. Everybody has to believe that Chuck Norris is willing to blow himself up if people do not follow his intent for them to take to the exits.

So Mr. Bernanke, are you ready to blow yourself and the system up, just so that the people will start spending the money that 99% of them do not really have?

Sunday, October 16, 2011

What is net financial asset

This post follows from comments in the previous post, where the need arose to explain further what Tom Hickey termed in his comment as net financial assets. What Tom means with 'net financial assets' is net private sector savings, which can offset net private sector debt. That phrase means it is money that people can actually spend, not the meaningless generic term 'money' which can pertain to paper that no one owns or can spend. Both the monetarist concept of M and Tom's definition are part of what money is. M focuses on its changing quantity, Tom focuses on where it comes from. 'Net financial asset' seeks to distinguish how that specific money came about, because some are borrowed into existence, some are government spent into existence. Net financial assets are 'money' the private sector has that was government spent into existence. In our times of high debt, and debt deleveraging, it's also now very important to know how money comes about. Is it borrowed, or printed into existence, or is it structured synthetically? That way you know if that new money is increasing your savings, sinking you in debt, increasing or taking away from your future earnings, will rip your face off, or will blow the whole system up.

Government spending in itself creates the income that the private sector can use to buy government bonds. Put another way, the government's act of using private capacity can create the income that the private sector can use to buy government's borrowing that "funds" the spending (a circuitous process that seems to end up a wash, but with a corresponding higher net financial asset for the private sector). This income from government spending, which becomes 'net financial assets' can then be used by the person who receives it to purchase goods and services from another private person, transferring to that person the 'net financial asset' that he can use to buy other goods and services that he may require. "Net financial asset' then is what enables the private sector to increase aggregate demand without the corresponding liability of paying back that source of purchasing power.

In this system, net borrowing by the private sector is not the most powerful mechanism of increasing money supply or increasing aggregate demand, government spending is. Because the fiscal multiplier effect gave people income, they do not have to borrow the money from the bank anymore to get cash. If you have income from selling to your service to the government, or by selling it to someone who sold his service to the government, neither one of you have to go and borrow the money from the bank to buy your goods and services. The money supply increased without further borrowing. The private sector sold more goods without anyone going into debt.

What happens for example when everyone in the private sector who earned income via the multiplier effect of the fiscal spending suddenly simultaneously decide to withdraw their money from the bank? The bank gives them their money. The money comes from their deposit holdings in the bank, and not as borrowings from the bank. If they withdraw their deposit from the bank, the bank also doesn’t have to borrow it elsewhere. The bank already has the money because the people already put it there (when they earned the income or accumulated the 'net financial asset'), or someone else paying for their service put the money in their deposit. The only time the bank has to borrow the money withdrawn elsewhere is if it already lent that money money elsewhere, and needs the reserves to pay it back. If it’s a deposit, it’s already a deposit. And should the bank ever need the excess reserves to pay back an excess of demanded deposits, where does it get the money/reserves? It gets it from the government/Fed. That's a loan the banks can pay back once they accumulate back the deposits from the people after this roundrobin of withdrawals and redeposits.

Where did the money come from that the government is able to borrow? Monetarists and quasi-monetarists say that for every borrower there is a lender. Monetarists would even say that government deficit does not increase money supply, and government borrowing only crowds the private sector our of being able to borrow that same stock of money. So if the money the government borrows was, as monetarists say, already just sitting idle in some deposit accounts in the private sector, then what gave rise to that private sector deposit? Somebody else borrowing to give that depositor his money? So how is that borrower then getting the money to be able to pay back his own loan? From a further third person borrowing it as well? And how is that 3rd person getting the money to pay back his own loan? This question can go on to infinity. It doesn't make sense to insist that people in the private sector borrowed into existence all the money that the government then afterwards borrowed from them.

If it is true that only bank lending can increase the money supply and government deficits only shifts money from the private sector the government, how would you explain government borrowing rising to the current level it has, $15 Trillion and counting? How is government able to build today’s massive infrastructure projects when at the very beginning, it started off with just 1776 money supply? Where did those trillions of additional money come from? Where did that money come from? Is all of it private bank created? So people are in the hook to pay it all back to some private banks? How did private banks ever get the balls to lend private people, who cannot manufacture money but have to earn it, those trillions of money that just ended up being used to finance government borrowing? More importantly, when the private sector is in balance sheet recession, it would be very erroneous to think that the private sector is the source of government borrowing. At any price. You think you can offer a high enough interest rate to induce folks currently on food stamps to buy more government bonds? What about businessmen now losing sales, what interest rate will make them buy up more bonds? How about those with negative equity, how much you think you can sell to them if we double the current rate?

In that view of the world where every circulating money came from a bank loan, everything will crash one day. That’s an inevitability, because eventually, in that view of the world, people will never earn enough to pay back the loans plus the interest. That world, if it were the real world, is a ticking time bomb one day bound to collapse, when the last person who borrows money decides not to pay the second last person to borrow, and so on. Everything in this view of the world will come crashing down when that day comes, and all it takes is a few unscrupulous people to untangle that ponzi scheme. And once indeed this ponzi scheme stops, how will the system ever get back to work? No one in the private sector can start the process again without having to borrow what he spends. If the government were to be timid to increase spending when private sector stops spending, because of the notion that 'the law forbids anyone or any entity from spending first before funding', then it's game over.

It also doesn't make sense to reform this view of the system by mandating that banks only loan the deposits that they already have. In this scenario, no new money will be created at all. If bank lending were limited to deposits, all loans will have to be callable at any time when the depositor demands his money back. It would be wrong again to assume that since for every borrower, there is a lender, those who would have been lenders just need to start the spending process. Who are these net lenders? Aren't these mostly banks who are in the business of lending, and not of spending? if they cannot make any new loans, they go out of business. And I wouldn't put much confidence either in non-bank private sector people who are hoarding money to re-start the spending process.

I've always wondered why many so-called free market thinkers are monetarists. Just because monetarism enables certain capitalists to make money regardless of what happens to the real economy doesn't mean monetary policy assists in attaining a really free market. Monetarists justify the power of monetary policy via its ability to instil 'animal spirits' or confidence in the private sector. Because the central bank is lowering interest rates or increasing money supply, they believe that that is enough to instil confidence. But increasing money in itself doesn't necessarily mean it increases people's income, or 'net financial assets'. Because the only transmission mechanism that enables this increased money to go from the banks (which are the only entities that deal directly with the central bank) to the people who will actually use it is more borrowing, increasing money supply does not necessarily lead to increased demand. How common is it for example for the fed to buy treasuries from the non-bank sector?

Society doesn't become more confident without an increase in what Tom calls 'net financial assets'. Without this, there'll be no increase in aggregate demand. Without increasing demand, there's no increasing aggregate sales, and no additional borrowing. It's as simple as that. Confidence by itself is just hot air. Inspiring market confidence by itself does not make dollars magically appear in someone’s bank account. Neither does it make someone who didn’t have an iota of cashflow any more creditworthy.

P.S. More from Tom below. And here's a useful visualization of sector balances from HBL.