Will paying for Russian Oil and Gas in roubles result in the
fall of the dollar as global reserve currency?
Background on Russia's invasion of Ukraine
For various reasons related to geopolitics, last February,
Russia invaded Ukraine. To avoid
potential escalation into World War 3, the United States and its western allies
decided to pinch Russia where it hurts, while avoiding launching an outright
war with Russia, a nuclear power – its economic lifeline. They launched economic and financial
sanctions with the stated aim of crippling Russian capacity for a protracted
war, and to depower Putin and his billionaire supporters.
The sanctions regime included sanctions on Russia’s largest
banks, and freezing of their dollar assets held in western banks. This resulted
in Russia being unable to access its vast hoard of dollar and Euro reserves,
which it had accumulated through sales of its commodities to the West, and
which it had counted on to prop up its economy, its currency, and fund its
military campaign. The goal was precisely
that, to cut the source of funds to further its campaign in Ukraine.
Sanctions however stopped short of fully cutting off all
trade and economic ties with Russia. Russia after all supplied much of Europe’s
oil and gas requirements. Which gave Russia the loophole it needed to get
around the sanctions on its banks.
Russia could therefore continue to earn hard currency while
it continues to sell its oil and commodities to Europe. However, as long as
these continued to be transacted in dollars and euros, these will be coursed
through Western controlled banks and clearing bodies, which are subject to US
and European laws and policies, of which the escalating bank sanctions on
Russian banks are part. By transacting the sales in roubles, buyers are forced
to source roubles to pay for their oil and gas, and roubles can only be sourced in quantity at Russian banks. By
effectively transferring the venue of exchange from western controlled to
Russian-controlled banks, Russia effectively limited the potency of the bank
sanctions. The West cannot now further escalate
the sanctions to all Russian banks, as this would effectively cut Europe’s
ability to source these needed commodities from Russia. They can, but at great risk tom causing
prolonged recession in their home economies, and potentially weakening their
domestic political clout.
By transacting sales in roubles going forward, this will create
new greater demand for roubles that was not there before. Whereas before,
Russia was content to just accumulate dollars and euros, occasionally
converting them to roubles as domestic transactions required it, while hoarding
the rest as global reserve, now it’s the western nations who will need to
accumulate roubles, so that they can continue buying Russian commodities.
This can be viewed as an increase in international value of
the rouble, and decline in the use of the dollar and euro.
Background on dollar’s rise as global reserve currency
The dollars rise to global reserve status is widely accepted
to start from the end of World War 2, when due to the widespread destruction of
European economies and industry during the war, only US manufacturing prowess remained intact, and the
US had the financial capability to supply much of Europe’s and the world’s,
needs. This resulted in countries’
increased demand for the currency, demand which continued to rise even as
Europe started to become resilient again.
Much of the world’s trade was done in dollars, or were
quoted in dollars, because for a long time, the US was the only country with a
stable enough financial system, that it became a self-reinforcing condition to conduct
international trade in dollars. As more trade was done in dollars, this created
more demand for dollars, which resulted in the dollar being preferred for more
trades.
Because the dollar was the default currency for most global
trade, it then logically also became the default reserve currency preference of
most nations. In lieu of accumulating
gold, as the global consensus for acquiring wealth, acquiring dollars became
the norm for many countries that started to accumulate surpluses from trade.
2008 onwards
The most serious threat to the global acceptance of the US
dollar as default reserve currency was during the 2008 crisis, as widely
covered at the time on this blog. When
large financial institutions in the US started blowing up, the US had to
respond by propping up measures such as quantitative easing and the fall of
interest rate to the zero bound. This
resulted in a lot of people speculating that the US will print the dollar til
it loses all value. I argued, against
such, assertions on this blog, and so far, until now, 14 years later, the dollar
has not yet to lose value like Zimbabwe’s currency, despite rolling out the
largest stimulus ever in history in 2020.
Since 2008 however, this widespread speculation contributed
to many trends, including the rise of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies; the hunt
for alternative currencies that can diversify central banks’ reserve baskets;
and greater speculation in ‘scarce’ assets that will increase in value when
valued in the dollar losing value.
Many speculated that the Chinese yuan could take the place
of the dollar as the default standard, given China’s meteoric rise in global
trade. But since China continues to
control the supply of yuan, and maintains its peg to the dollar, the yuan has
not been the threat to the dollar as some have thought.
Where China and Russia still fall short
This is I believe is the quagmire Russia will find itself in. Will they allow the rouble to be freely
available anywhere in the world, and allow it to feely float, as the US does
the dollar? What happens when a rising
rouble makes their exports more expensive, or a falling rouble makes imports too
costly for local consumers? Will they allow market forces to dictate, or will
they intervene heavily, as China does?
A further competitive advantage the US has, that allows them
to freely float the dollar globally, is that the US had a large domestic
market, which decreases their reliance on exports, lower than other countries’ level
of reliance to theirs. The US has also always
been an innovative economy, that always had a lot of things to sell, and by the
time a rising dollar was making the exports of yesteryear highly expensive,
they were already on to their next exporting star, and gladly outsourced production
of expensive goods elsewhere.
So what’s next?
Businesses will continue to adapt. This recent spate of sanctions is a test case whether the dollar will fall as default reserve currency. However, since there has been no difference in the economic preferences and bargaining positions of countries with regard to global trade and investment since a decade ago, my bet is on the US dollar to continue its reign for the foreseeable time.
Short intro from the author
“Conventional approaches, unconventional conclusions” on the global finance and economic issues of the day. That’s the theme of this blog with the seemingly smug and sarcastic title of Rogue Economist Rants, wherein I blogged from May 2008 up to May 2012. Hello, dear reader, and welcome to my blog. I blog pseudonymously as Rogue Econ or Rogue Economist.
I chose economics as my specific area of conversation because of its relevance to current world problems. (More background here). And ever since I read Joseph Stiglitz’ Globalization and its Discontents, I have come to realize that what we sometimes know to be correct prescriptions to economic problems could actually be, if you think about it, making problems worse. His book convinced me that we really don’t know enough about economics for anyone to be a fool-proof prescriptive policy adviser. Each case is different, and requires a specific inquiry into its own circumstances.
And that is why I strove to see the unconventional in the conventional. I also strove to determine whether, even when using conventional approaches, if this can lead to unconventional conclusions. And in economics, focusing on different sets of data, or analyzing events from different starting points, even when using the same approach, does lead to different conclusions. Hopefully, my body of posts demonstrates this over-riding intent sufficiently to readers.
The key take away of the posts I made in 2011-2012 can be summarized around the following basic tenets, as laid out in my sidebar since 2011:
3 QUESTIONS TEST OF WHETHER IT IS WORTH THE PUBLIC SPENDING
1. Does this create productive jobs for those who would be otherwise unemployed?
2. Will the newly hired workers have meaningful income that they can spend back in the economy?
3. Is the output of the jobs adding to capacity of goods/services demanded?
If it generates income for the unemployed, aggregate demand will go up. If it adds to demanded capacity, there will be no inflation. If the output is demanded by people, there will be no wastage.
I consider myself an economic realist. My views lean towards free market, but I appreciate Keynesian prescriptions to jumpstart stalled demand. I am sympathetic with Post-Keynesians, but draw the line on calls for permanent government intervention.
I also have another minor blog in Tumblr, which I treated as a baby blog platform, and which I considered a good one-stop location for comments I made on other people's blogs and websites outside of this main blog. Very often, these comments were the germ of ideas that eventually formed into full blog posts over here. Also, it is worthwhile to mention, some full-blown posts were also developed from comment discussions that happened at Seeking Alpha, which syndicated some of my blog posts from here, as chosen by that site’s curators.
I stopped blogging for the next ten years after 2012, because I did not want to just end up repeating myself on topics I've already covered. However, let's see if every now and then, a topic or raging issue of the day compels me to come back and cover it with a new blog post here. Meantime, I'm occassionally on twitter.
Once again, this is Rogue Economist, wishing that you, the reader, get some food for thought from reading this blog.

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